Tabla de contenidos
European Union
Russia
December and January have been marked by intense and continuous activity within the framework of the European Union’s sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, with a series of measures aimed at further strengthening economic and financial pressure on the country. This tightening comes as the EU moves forward with defining a definitive ban on oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, as well as strengthening financial cooperation with Ukraine.
Within this context, it is worth highlighting the adoption, on 13 December 2025, of Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 on emergency measures in response to the serious economic difficulties caused by Russia’s actions in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine[1] . This new Regulation establishes exceptional and temporary measures to prevent Russia from accessing the assets and reserves of its Central Bank and related entities in the EU, prohibiting any direct or indirect transfer of those assets. It also requires central banks and financial institutions to report regularly to the Commission on frozen assets. In addition, it provides for the protection of EU banks and financial institutions against claims and enforcement attempts (including court rulings or awards) brought by Russia or entities linked to it due to the impact of these measures.
In order to increase the restrictions on the activity of vessels whose operation favours or supports actions or policies that contribute to Russia’s actions against Ukraine, on 18 December 2025, Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 was adopted, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2617 of 18 December 2025 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. In particular, 41 new entries of vessels were added to the list in Annex XVI to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, which are prohibited from entering the ports and locks of Member States, as well as from receiving a wide range of services related to maritime transport and maritime. These new additions bring the number of sanctioned vessels to almost 600, in line with the recent EU Declaration on the possible threats from the shadow fleet.
On 22 December, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2648 was also adopted, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, extending the application of this Decision until 31 July 2026.
With regard to the list of natural and legal persons, on 15 December 2025 the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2568, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025, amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities. These two instruments added twelve natural persons and two entities to the list in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2024/2642. They include police personnel, ideologists, analysts and members of military intelligence, as well as two entities, which, according to the Council, are involved in electronic warfare and amplifying the government’s discourse. Furthermore, on 22 December, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2638 was adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1485 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia, as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2637 of 22 December 2025, amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/1484 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia, adding two natural persons who are members of the Russian judiciary. Finally, on 29 January, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/259 was adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/260, amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, through which six additional natural persons were included in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, including journalists, actors and dancers.
Against this backdrop of intensified measures, the maximum price of Russian oil was revised again in mid-January. On 14 January 2026, the EU approved Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/124, amending Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 ,concerning restrictive measures in response to Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The amendment updates the so-called price cap, i.e. the threshold per barrel below which Russian crude oil can benefit from an exemption from the ban on providing maritime transport and technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial support related to shipments to third countries.
Finally, on 29 January 2026, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262 of 29 January 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and for armed groups and entities in the Middle East and Red Sea region; as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/263 of 29 January 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and for armed groups and entities in the Middle East and Red Sea region. According to the Council, the Russian Federation has been using Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and components, including in attacks against civilian populations and infrastructure. In response, the EU has focused on Iran’s state-sponsored programme for the development and production of these systems and, as a result, four individuals and six entities, including executives and companies involved in arms brokering and trading, have been added to the sanctions lists, thereby extending the scope of the restrictive regime on the military supply chain involved in the conflict.
Belarus
On 15 December, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2585 was adopted, amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and Council Regulation (CFSP) 2025/2601 amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and its involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
These measures aim to introduce new criteria for inclusion on lists, allowing sanctions to be imposed not only on those directly responsible, but also on those who support, benefit from or act through entities owned or controlled by them, when they contribute to actions attributable to Belarus that undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the European Union or in third countries, including dynamics specific to hybrid activities. The focus is on behaviours such as information manipulation and interference, sabotage, malicious or hybrid cyber activities, disruption of critical infrastructure and certain unauthorised incursions into the territory or airspace of Member States (with recent references, for example, to incidents affecting Lithuania).
Venezuela
Also on 15 December 2025, Decision (CFSP) 2025/2586 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2559 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, extending the measures until 10 January 2027 and updating the entries for four natural persons in Annex IV.
Haiti
On 1 December 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2443 implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2309 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Haiti was adopted. This first act added two natural persons to the list of those sanctioned for their involvement in threats to the peace and security of the country. Subsequently, on 15 December 2025, a second instrument, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2567, was adopted, further extending the designations under the same regime.
Notable among these is the inclusion of the former president of Haiti (2011-2016), who is accused of financing, sponsoring and supporting various armed gangs to promote his political agenda and protect his economic interests, as well as the sanctioned entity Banda 5 Segond, a powerful criminal organisation based in Port-au-Prince, which is part of the Viv Ansanm (Living Together) coalition and is attributed with serious crimes such as murder, rape, piracy, arms and drug trafficking, and obstruction of humanitarian assistance.
These sanctions are applied under Regulation (EU) 2022/2309 and respond to the increase in gang violence, human rights violations and persistent impunity in Haiti, forming part of the EU’s preventive framework to curb the humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
On 15 December 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2558 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 (EU sanctions regime against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) was adopted.
The most significant development was the updating of the files on one natural person and three entities for their continued involvement in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and in the evasion of sanctions. affecting, first and foremost, the deputy director of the Munitions Industry Department, who is considered responsible for these programmes (with recent references to his presence at inspections linked to nuclear warheads in March 2023 and a visit to a uranium enrichment facility in September 2024).
Secondly, the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, capable of producing fissile material for military purposes; likewise, the Maritime Administrative Office, accused of facilitating the circumvention of sanctions by changing the names and re-registering ships and providing false documentation; and the Korea Paekho Trading Corporation, dedicated to the export of art and the construction of statues abroad, used to obtain foreign currency and international financial access with which to finance nuclear programmes, its participation in trade fairs in Vladivostok and Pyongyang in 2024 having been detected.
Mali
On 1 December 2025, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2436 was adopted, by which the European Union extends and updates restrictive measures in response to the unstable situation in Mali, as well as Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2435, which updates European Union sanctions in response to instability in Mali by amending the list of natural and legal persons subject to restrictive measures.
The files on four key figures are maintained or updated due to their negative impact on the democratic transition. Of particular note are the President of the National Transition Council, identified as one of the leaders of the 2020 coup and for promoting decisions that consolidate the junta’s power, and the former head of the Wagner Group in Mali, considered responsible for violence and serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions such as the ‘Moura massacre’ (2022).
The regulation comes in a context in which the transitional government has failed to meet the deadlines set out in the 2020 Transition Charter and ignored demands from ECOWAS, which has also adopted sanctions for blocking the return to constitutional order.
Serious human rights violations and abuses
On 4 December 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2471 was adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 and updating the list of persons and entities subject to EU restrictive measures for serious human rights violations and abuses, incorporating relevant profiles in different regional contexts.
The Implementing Regulation updates and maintains sanctions, by region, against officials and entities involved in repression and serious abuses.
Firstly, in China (Xinjiang), sanctions are directed against those responsible for surveillance, detentions and forced labour (including the XPCC Public Security Bureau).
Secondly, in Russia, the Wagner Group and its network, as well as judges and prison officials involved in the treatment of opponents. Similarly, in Israel and the Palestinian territories, individuals and groups associated with violence in the West Bank and an entity that blocks humanitarian aid, together with actors linked to illegal settlements; and, in other scenarios, those responsible in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Syria and North Korea for persecution, sexual violence, torture and enforced disappearances.
Democratic Republic of Congo
On 8 December 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2508 was adopted, within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005, in order to implement and adjust restrictive measures in response to instability and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The most relevant change is the update to Annex I bis, where one person (entry 41) has been removed and the information on eight others has been updated, specifying the reasons why sanctions against them remain in place. The aim is to maintain or update the inclusion of profiles particularly linked to public incitement to hatred and violence against the Banyamulenge community, for the forced recruitment of minors and for serious abuses (including sexual violence and attacks against civilians).
Guatemala
On 9 January 2016, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/87 was adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/287 and amending the list of natural and legal persons subject to EU restrictive measures in relation to the situation in Guatemala, by updating five entries corresponding to key individuals. The regulation updates information on senior officials of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and leaders of an associated organisation; the Attorney General, for her involvement in actions aimed at challenging the 2023 election results and for promoting arbitrary proceedings against journalists, judges and activists; the head of the FECI, for leading actions against the formation of Semilla and for his involvement in proceedings such as the raid on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the opening of sealed ballot boxes, as well as persecuting actors linked to the fight against corruption alongside the CICIG; and, in the area of partner organisations, the president of the Foundation Against Terrorism (FCT) and its legal representative, for promoting politically motivated campaigns of denunciation, prosecution and intimidation against journalists, justice operators and the democratically elected government.
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
On 16 January 2026, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/122 was adopted, amending and updating the regime of restrictive measures against persons and entities supporting, facilitating or enabling violent actions by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/123, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/386 and adjusting the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures in relation to those who support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The regulation removes I. Barhoum from the list due to his death and updates the entry for Abdelbasit Elhassan Mohamed Khair Hamza, identified as a Hamas financier based in Sudan, for his role in managing companies linked to Hamas’ investment portfolio and in channelling funds through a business network that includes Al Rowad Real Estate Development and Al Zawaya Group for Development and Investment.
Iran
On 29 January 2026, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026/265, which extends the regime of restrictive measures against certain persons and entities in Iran in view of the serious human rights situation in the country, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/267, implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 and updating the regime of restrictive measures against certain persons and entities in Iran in view of the human rights situation.
These measures are intended to respond, among other factors, to the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals, the use of violence against demonstrators and the intimidation tactics attributed to the security forces, as well as to reinforce the demand for respect for freedom of expression, association and access to information, including the restoration of the internet.
The regulation extends the list of those subject to sanctions by amending Annex I and adding 15 individuals and 6 entities. Those subject to sanctions include senior officials and judicial and security officials, as well as commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, for their role in the repression of protests and the imposition of severe sentences. Organisations and companies linked to censorship and digital and media control (SATRA, Seraj, WGDICC, Yaftar, Douran Software and the Masaf Institute) have also been added for alleged surveillance activities, blocking of services and campaigns against dissidents.
Sudan
On 29 January 2026, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/254 was adopted, amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 and extending restrictive measures against actors undermining stability and political transition in Sudan, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/251, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2147 and extending the list of persons subject to restrictive measures for undermining stability and the political transition in Sudan, in a context of intensifying conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with particular severity in Darfur and around El Fasher.
These measures are aimed at identifying and sanctioning those responsible for serious human rights violations, abuses of international humanitarian law or actions that threaten the peace and security of the country, by including new files in the relevant annex. In this context, the Regulation adds seven individuals, including the commander and brother of the RSF leader, for his involvement in the acquisition of weapons and support business structures (such as Tradive General Trading Co.), as well as commanders associated with atrocities in El Fasher, including executions and abuses against detainees. On the SAF side, sanctions are imposed on the commander of the Baraa bin Malik battalion/militia for ordering summary executions of civilians; and Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda, a community leader (emir) accused of collaborating in recruitment and inciting violence against farming communities (kanabi), with participation in massacres and the burning of villages.
United States
Russia
On 4 December 2025, OFAC reissued and amended a series of general licences relating to transactions involving assets linked to Lukoil International GmbH and other operations related to Lukoil’s network of petrol stations outside Russia, as well as other sectoral authorisations. These licences were intended to mitigate certain humanitarian or administrative effects of previous sanctions against Russian business groups, allowing certain operational maintenance and orderly liquidation activities until specific dates. Among these authorisations, GL 128B stood out, authorising until April 2026 the maintenance, operation and liquidation of Lukoil service stations outside the Russian Federation affected by previous sanctions.
Similarly, in January 2026, with immediate effect from 14 January, OFAC replaced General Licence 131A with 131B, extending the temporary authorisation until 28 February, under specific conditions, to negotiate and execute contingent contracts relating to the sale of Lukoil International GmbH and related maintenance activities, with a deadline of 28 February 2026. The updated version of this licence includes clear conditions on which transactions are authorised and which remain prohibited, particularly with regard to blocked materials and the transfer of funds within the Russian Federation.
Belarus
On 15 December 2025, OFAC announced the issuance of General Licence 13 on Belarus, “authorising transactions involving the Belarusian Potash Company, Agrorozkvit LLC, and Belaruskali OAO.” The measure is presented as a specific authorisation to allow certain transactions involving Joint Stock Company Belarusian Potash Company, Agrorozkvit LLC, and Belaruskali OAO, entities based in Belarus, where they play a strategic role in the global fertiliser market, especially potash (potassium chloride), a key input for global agriculture.
In practice, a general licence of this type operates as a regulated exception to existing prohibitions, allowing room for manoeuvre for operations that would otherwise be restricted by the applicable regime.
Central African Republic
In a statement dated 8 December 2025, the Treasury commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), reaffirming its commitment to accountability for human rights abuses.
On that basis, two individuals were designated for contributing to instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). Firstly, Jean-Francis Bozizé, a CAR citizen and son of former President François Bozizé, who allegedly transported arms and ammunition from neighbouring countries to the Coalition for the Patriots of Change (CPC), a rebel group accused of recruiting child soldiers and committing acts of sexual violence. Secondly, Mahamat Salleh, also a CAR national, who is described as a commander of the CPC and former zone commander of the affiliated group Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic, is accused of raping girls and forced sexual slavery.
Cyber sanctions
The OFAC cyber sanctions programme, launched on 1 April 2015 by Executive Order 13694, responds to the extraordinary threat posed by malicious cyber activities originating or directed from abroad against the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. This order allows sanctions to be imposed on individuals responsible for or complicit in such harmful cyber activities. In this context, on 30 December 2025, several entries of individuals designated in connection with Russia were removed.
Global Magnitsky Sanctions
On 12 December 2025, under the Global Magnitsky programme, which targets corrupt conduct and serious human rights violations with typical measures such as asset freezing on US soil, transaction restrictions and visa restrictions, OFAC published an update on 12 December 2025 consisting of the removal of several designations: Alexandre de Moraes, LEX – Instituto de Estudios Jurídicos Ltda. and Viviane Barci de Moraes.
This action reverses previous designations made on 22 September 2025, when OFAC sanctioned Lex Instituto for its alleged support of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) Alexandre de Moraes —designated on 30 July 2025 for authorising alleged arbitrary detentions and censoring freedom of expression in Brazil— and Viviane Barci de Moraes as head of the entity.
International Criminal Court (ICC)
On 18 December 2025, the United States designated two judges of the International Criminal Court pursuant to Executive Order 14203, relating to sanctions against that institution, on the grounds that these individuals are directly involved in the ICC’s efforts to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute Israeli nationals without Israel’s consent, including voting in favour of the ICC’s majority decision against Israel’s appeal on 15 December. Simultaneously, OFAC issued General Licence No. 11, temporarily authorising transactions necessary for the orderly winding up of operations involving the designated individuals or entities majority-controlled by them. The licence, valid until mid-January 2026, stipulates that any payments must be made to blocked accounts in the United States and does not allow transactions with other sanctioned persons unless separately authorised.
Sudan
On 9 December 2025, OFAC imposed sanctions on four individuals and four entities, mainly Colombian nationals and companies, for their alleged involvement in the recruitment of former Colombian military personnel and the training of soldiers—including minors—to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the civil conflict in Sudan, one of the worst humanitarian crises today. According to the statement, the RSF has been accused of attacking civilians since April 2023, including murder, sexual violence, and blocking humanitarian aid.
Transnational Criminal Organisations (TCOs)
On 17 December 2025, OFAC added José Antonio Yépez Ortiz, alias “El Marro”, and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (also known as the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel or CSRL, established in 2014) to its Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), both under the category of transnational criminal organisations.
Venezuela
During December 2025, several significant developments were recorded in the sanctions regime applicable to Venezuela, in a context of growing bilateral tensions with the United States that culminated in the events of January 2026.
On the one hand, on 19 December 2025, OFAC published General Licence No. 5T, which authorises, as of February 2026, certain transactions related to the PDVSA 2020 8.5% bond ( ), replacing a previous licence and maintaining the rest of the regime’s prohibitions in force.
On the other hand, on 31 December 2025, new designations of foreign companies operating in the Venezuelan oil sector were announced, as well as the identification of several vessels as blocked property due to their links with those companies. The Treasury recalled that these measures complement previous sanctions adopted against the state oil company and associated operators.
Sanctions against drug trafficking
On 22 January 2026, OFAC designated five Costa Rican nationals — including the leaders of the largest cocaine trafficking network in Costa Rica — and five local entities for trafficking multi-tonnes of cocaine from Colombia to the United States and Europe via the port of Moín in Limón, as well as for money laundering. This network, allied with other previously sanctioned drug traffickers, has generated violence over control of routes and has been partially dismantled by Costa Rican operations, in a coordinated action with the DEA and Costa Rican authorities under Executive Order 14059 against illicit drug trafficking.
Sanctions against terrorism
On 21 January 2026, OFAC designated six organisations in Gaza (Al-Falah Society, Al-Nur Society, Al-Salameh Society, Merciful Hands, Qawafil Society and Waed Society) and the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), based in Beirut and Istanbul, for acting as covert fronts for the military wing of Hamas (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades), diverting funds from international donors intended for humanitarian aid to finance terrorist operations. These entities, which are integrated into the Hamas structure according to documents seized after 7 October 2023, provide direct financial support (such as the $2.5 million transferred by Al-Falah), services to combatants and advocacy for Hamas prisoners, while the PCPA organises flotillas to break the blockade of Gaza under the direction of Hamas’s International Relations Office. In addition, Zaher Khaled Hassan Birawi (“Abu Hasan”), a senior PCPA official in the United Kingdom, was sanctioned for his material support.
Iran
On 23 January 2026, OFAC designated eight companies and nine vessels associated with the Iranian oil transport fleet, including Sea Bird (UAE), Avon (India), Al Diab II (Oman), Cesaria (Seychelles), Longevity 7 (Marshall Islands), Eastern Hero, Aqua Spirit (Liberia) and Chiron 5 with Keel, which it considers to be transporting crude oil, liquefied gas, naphtha and other petroleum products from Iran to Asia, Africa and the Middle East in 2025 and 2026. The action, taken under Executive Order 13902 against the Iranian oil and petrochemical sector, is part of the Trump administration’s economic pressure policy under Presidential National Security Memorandum NSPM-2.
United Kingdom
Russia
In the area of sanctions against Russia and cyberspace, on 4 December 2025, the British Government designated multiple individuals and entities, including the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) and associated officers, following the publication of the final report of the investigation into the Salisbury poisonings, which concluded that GRU agents were responsible.
Furthermore, on 9 December 2025, seven additional individuals and entities were designated under the sanctions regime against Russia for foreign information manipulation and interference activities, including Rybar LLC and its director Mikhail Zvinchuk, the Centre for Geopolitical Expertise and its founder Aleksandr Dugin, and several organisations linked to PRAVFOND, allegedly involved in coordinated efforts to undermine democratic processes by creating fake news sites and automated social media accounts.
On 15 January 2026, OFSI also amended General Licence INT/2024/4423849 relating to the prohibition of maritime services and the price cap on Russian oil, reducing the cap from USD 47.60 per barrel to USD 44.10 per barrel, effective from 23:01 GMT on 31 January 2026, and adding a transitional provision for existing contracts that comply with the old cap until 16 April 2026.
China
OFSI designated Integrity Technology Group Incorporated and Sichuan Anxun Information Technology Co., Ltd. under the UK cyber sanctions regime on 4 and 9 December 2025 for their alleged involvement in malicious cyber activities affecting computer systems in the UK and among allies. These measures involve the freezing of assets and prohibit persons subject to UK law from providing funds or economic resources to these companies.
Iraq
On 10 December 2025, the United Kingdom removed Munir Al Qubaysi from its sanctions regime on Iraq, following his prior removal from the United Nations sanctions list. Al Qubaysi had been included in 2004 for his role as director of an entity that allegedly operated as a front company for the procurement of weapons for Iraq.
Syria
With regard to Syria, on 19 December 2025, the United Kingdom added nine new designations, comprising six individuals and three entities, all subject to asset freezing, following four removals from the list under the Syrian sanctions regime on 17 December 2025, although these removals remain subject to sanctions in other jurisdictions such as the Iran regimes, the Iran nuclear regime and the chemical weapons regime.
Structural changes
Finally, on 28 January 2026, a major structural change to the UK sanctions system came into force: the UK Sanctions List (UKSL) became the sole official source for all UK sanctions designations, meaning that the OFSI Consolidated List of Asset Freeze Targets is no longer in use.
United Nations
Somalia / Al-Shabaab
On 12 December 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2806 (2025), renewing the sanctions regime against Al-Shabaab in Somalia until 30 November 2026. This decision affirms the arms embargo, the ban on coal exports and the other restrictions contained in the regime, and includes the extension of the mandate of the panel of experts that monitors compliance with these anti-crisis measures in Somalia.
[1] For clarification purposes, any reference in this document to “war” or “war of aggression” reproduces verbatim the terminology used in the relevant legal instruments and policy documents of the European Union. These terms are included strictly for reasons of accuracy and consistency and do not imply any independent qualification beyond that contained in the sources cited.
