The evolution of the regulatory framework of the Helms-Burton Act and the decision of the Biden administration to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism had significant legal, economic and diplomatic implications, affecting both the actors involved in bilateral relations and the geopolitical dynamics in the region.
The Helms-Burton Act, officially called the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, was a fundamental pillar of US policy towards Cuba, reinforcing the trade embargo and establishing coercive measures to prevent international recognition of the expropriations carried out by the Cuban regime after the 1959 revolution. One of the most controversial aspects of this law was its Title III, which allowed US citizens to file lawsuits against foreign entities that benefited from confiscated property in Cuba. Although its application was suspended for more than two decades, the Trump administration decided to reactivate it in 2019, triggering a series of lawsuits and restrictions for foreign companies with investments on the island.
The reestablishment of the suspension of Title III is particularly significant, a decision that eliminated the immediate risk of litigation against foreign companies operating in Cuba and restored stability to strategic sectors such as tourism and real estate investment. However, he noted that lawsuits filed before the suspension were still pending in US courts, which could lead to legal disputes over the possible retroactive application of the measure. US case law, reflected in emblematic cases such as Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994), suggests that provisions with substantive effects cannot be applied retroactively unless Congress explicitly so provides, which could be decisive in the resolution of these cases.
At the regulatory level, the suspension of Title III was framed within a broader interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, which establishes the pre-eminence of federal laws over any other conflicting provisions. This doctrine was reaffirmed in key court decisions, such as Marbury v. Madison (1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), which consolidated the authority of Congress to legislate on foreign relations and economic sanctions. In this context, the decision to suspend the application of Title III reflected a change in the Biden administration’s strategy, aimed at reducing pressure on the business sector and restoring diplomatic room for maneuver with its European and Latin American allies.
On the other hand, the impact of Cuba’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a measure adopted by the Biden administration a few days before the end of its term, meant a relief of international sanctions. The designation of Cuba as a sponsor of terrorism has been a central element of US foreign policy since 1982, when the Reagan administration included it on the list on the grounds that the Cuban government supported insurgent movements in Latin America. Although this classification was lifted in 2015 by the Obama administration as part of its strategy to normalize relations with Cuba, the Trump administration re-established it in 2021, citing the Cuban government’s support for Colombian guerrilla groups and the protection granted to US fugitives.
The document emphasized that the decision to remove Cuba from the list was the result of a combination of political, economic and strategic factors. First, the role of the Catholic Church’s mediation was highlighted, facilitating the release of hundreds of political prisoners in Cuba, including those detained after the 2021 anti-government protests. This gesture allowed the Biden administration to justify its decision as part of a broader effort to improve the human rights situation on the island and mitigate the humanitarian effects of the embargo. Second, the economic crisis that Cuba was going through was a determining factor in the reconsideration of its designation, as the sanctions associated with this classification severely restricted its access to international financing and worsened the living conditions of its population.
From a geopolitical perspective, Cuba’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism also responded to the United States’ interest in countering the growing influence of China and Russia in Latin America. The Biden administration sought to project an image of diplomatic pragmatism, using this policy change as a mechanism to reduce tensions and lay the foundations for an eventual dialogue with Havana. However, the measure was harshly criticized by conservative sectors in the United States, especially by Republican legislators who considered that it weakened the pressure on the Cuban regime and granted concessions without demanding substantial political reforms.
In January 2025, President Donald Trump reversed his predecessor Joe Biden’s decision to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, thus reimposing the previously lifted sanctions. This action led to the reactivation of financial and commercial restrictions that directly affected the Cuban economy, limiting its access to international markets and hindering transactions with foreign entities. In addition, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinstated the “Cuba Restricted List” prohibiting transactions with companies linked to the Cuban army and government, which further complicated the island’s commercial and financial operations.
The sanctions imposed include restrictions on access to international financing, a ban on transactions with US banking entities and limitations on exports of critical goods and technology. Furthermore, foreign companies that do business with Cuban entities can face secondary sanctions, which discourages investment in the island. These measures directly affect key sectors such as tourism, manufacturing and foreign trade, aggravating the economic and social crisis in Cuba.
With the collaboration of Imara Betancourt, coordinator of the LILF office in Cuba.
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