{"id":26351,"date":"2026-10-01T15:28:54","date_gmt":"2026-10-01T14:28:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lupicinio.com\/?p=26351"},"modified":"2026-10-01T15:28:54","modified_gmt":"2026-10-01T14:28:54","slug":"international-sanctions-%c2%b7-august-and-september-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lupicinio.com\/en\/international-sanctions-%c2%b7-august-and-september-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"International Sanctions \u00b7 August and September 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

European Union<\/h2>\n

Russia<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 6th of August 2026, the Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2026\/1844 of the 23rd<\/sup> of July 2026, amending Council Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect alleged actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L, 2026\/1844, 23.7.2026).<\/a><\/p>\n

Regulation (EU) 2026\/1844<\/a> amends Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 to introduce specific exemptions from the restrictive measures against entities and individuals sanctioned in the context of the ostensible conflict with Ukraine, allowing for the fulfilment of pre-existing contractual obligations, the continuation of rail transport between Russia and the European Union (via JSC Russian Railways) and the implementation of the suppossed Paks II nuclear project. Furthermore, the Regulation extends the right to seek compensation before the courts of the Member States and prohibits the recognition or enforcement within the EU of Russian court rulings based on laws believed to intend to circumvent or counteract European sanctions.<\/p>\n

On the 7th<\/sup> of August, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1940 of the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026 was also adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 on restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine..<\/a><\/p>\n

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1940<\/strong>, adopted on the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026, amends Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 to extend the European Union\u2019s sanctions against Russia. Specifically, the document formalises the inclusion of five Russian nationals on the list of sanctioned individuals<\/strong> (Ramil Badgutdinov, Sergey Bashkov, Sergey Bessonov, Viktor Ivanov and Aleksandr Dyukarev). All these individuals are senior executives of strategic companies within the Russian military, industrial and aerospace complex \u2014 apparently responsible for manufacturing ballistic missiles, drones, military communication systems and radars \u2014 who are being penalised for providing direct material and technological support<\/strong> to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, on the 7th<\/sup> of August, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/1939 of the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026 amending Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine<\/a> was adopted.<\/p>\n

Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/1939<\/strong>, adopted on the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026, amends the European Union\u2019s framework regulation (Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP) to extend the sanctions imposed on Russia over the seeming conflict in Ukraine. This resolution formalises the inclusion of these five new individuals<\/strong> on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures. With this legal update, the Council is fulfilling its commitment to increase pressure on the Russian Federation, whilst thought by the EU of reaffirming its unwavering political, financial and military support for the Ukrainian state.<\/p>\n

On the 11th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2026\/506 of the 23rd<\/sup> of April 2026, amending Council Regulation (EU) No 833\/2014 concerning restrictive measures in response to Russia\u2019s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, (OJ L, 2026\/506, 23.4.2026).<\/a><\/p>\n

The corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2026\/506<\/strong> rectifies a typographical error in Annex VI of the regulation concerning the restrictive measures imposed on Russia due to its destabilising actions in Ukraine, as claimed by the EU. Specifically, the document corrects a customs code relating to the exemptions applicable to platinum in the rough, semi-manufactured or in powder form (heading Ex 7110), replacing the erroneous code \u2018NC 7210 29\u2019 with the correct identifier \u2018NC 7110 29\u2019<\/strong> in order to clarify precisely which subcategories of materials are excluded from the sanctions and to ensure their correct application by customs authorities.<\/p>\n

On the 15th<\/sup> of September 2026, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2103 of the 15th<\/sup> of September 2026 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), amending Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 22nd<\/sup> of September 2026, the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2160 of the 22nd September 2026, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.<\/a><\/p>\n

Regulation (EU) 2026\/2160 updates the EU sanctions list relating to the war in Ukraine, amending the details of 104 individuals and 71 entities subject to the restrictive measures regime.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, it removes three deceased individuals from the list and lifts sanctions against three individuals and one entity, whilst maintaining and updating measures against numerous political, military and business figures linked to Russia and the destabilisation of Ukraine.<\/u><\/p>\n

On the 22nd<\/sup> of September 2026, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2161 of the 22nd<\/sup> of September 2026 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), amending Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n

Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2161 extends the EU sanctions relating to actions deemed to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine until the 22nd<\/sup> of September 2029.<\/p>\n

It also updates the details of 104 individuals and 71 entities subject to sanctions, removes references to three deceased individuals, and delists three individuals and one entity.<\/p>\n

On the 24th<\/sup> of September, the Official Journal of the European Union published Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2165 of the 24th<\/sup> of September 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024\/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia\u2019s destabilising activities.<\/a><\/p>\n

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2165<\/strong>, adopted on the 24th<\/sup> of September 2026, implements the regime of restrictive measures established by Regulation (EU) 2024\/2642, which aims to counter what are considered to be Russia\u2019s destabilising activities and hybrid campaigns against the European Union, its Member States and third countries. The decision responds in opinion of the European Council\u2019s call to step up urgent action to strengthen resilience and deter attacks involving disinformation and foreign interference promoted by the Kremlin.<\/p>\n

Through this regulation, the European Union adds the Russian journalist and media executive Xenia Vladimirovna Fedorova<\/strong>, former president and news director of RT France, to its sanctions list in Annex I. The text justifies her inclusion on the grounds that, following the suspension of RT in the EU, she has, according to the text, continued to supposedly disseminate disinformation and pro-Russian narratives through regular contributions to French media outlets, thereby undermining the stability and integrity of the EU.<\/p>\n

On the 24th<\/sup> of September, in the same vein, the EU published Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2164 of the 24th September 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024\/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia\u2019s destabilising activities.<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September, the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2184 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n

To give effect to these measures, the document amends Annex I to the original Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014, adding ten new individuals and seventeen entities to the official sanctions list.<\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September, in a similar vein, the EU adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2185 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026 amending Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2193 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, implementing Regulation (EU) 2024\/1485 on restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia,<\/a> was also adopted.<\/p>\n

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2193, adopted on the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, extends the restrictive measures imposed on Russia by adding ten new natural persons to the sanctions list in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2024\/1485.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, on the 29th<\/sup> of September, the EU adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2192 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024\/1484 concerning the adoption of restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia.<\/a><\/p>\n

Belarus <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 11th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2026\/513 of the 23rd<\/sup> of April 2026 amending Regulation (EC) No 765\/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and that country\u2019s involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (OJ L, 2026\/513, 23.4.2026).<\/a><\/p>\n

The corrigendum to Council Regulation (EU) 2026\/513<\/strong> corrects a typographical error in the annex to the regulation concerning the restrictive measures imposed on Belarus for its alleged involvement in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as claimed by the EU. Specifically, the document corrects a customs code relating to the exemptions applicable to platinum in the rough, semi-manufactured or in powder form, replacing the erroneous code \u2018CN 7210 29\u2019 with the correct code \u2018CN 7110 29\u2019 to specify exactly which subcategories of materials are excluded from the sanctions under heading Ex 7110.<\/p>\n

Afghanistan <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 23rd<\/sup> of September, the OJEU (Official Journal of the European Union) published Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2138 of the 22nd September 2026, implementing Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) No 753\/2011 concerning restrictive measures against certain persons, groups, undertakings and entities, in view of the situation in Afghanistan.<\/a><\/p>\n

This Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2138<\/strong>, adopted on the 22nd September 2026, implements EU legislation on restrictive measures (sanctions) against certain persons and entities associated with the situation in Afghanistan. The Regulation responds to previous updates to the data carried out by the United Nations Security Council Committee (established by Resolution 1988) during the spring of 2026.<\/p>\n

The regulation formally amends Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 753\/2011, updating in detail the identifying information for 24 individuals associated with the Taliban (including Abdul Baqi Basir, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mohammad Hassan Akhund, amongst others) and one entity. The changes include new passport numbers, aliases, dates and places of birth, biometric data and tribal affiliation details. The Regulation enters into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union and is directly applicable in all Member States.<\/p>\n

On the 23rd<\/sup> of September, in a similar vein, the OJEU published Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2137 of the 22nd<\/sup> of September 2026 implementing Decision 2011\/486\/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain persons, groups, undertakings and entities, in view of the situation in Afghanistan.<\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0Libya <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 7th<\/sup> of August, the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1941 of the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026 amending Council Regulation (EU) 2016\/44 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya<\/a> was also published in the OJEU.<\/p>\n

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1941<\/strong>, adopted on the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026, amends the European Union\u2019s framework of restrictive measures concerning Libya to bring it into line with a recent decision by the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. Specifically, the regulation updates Annex V to Regulation (EU) 2016\/44 to include the Cameroonian-flagged vessel AVAX<\/strong> on the list of sanctioned vessels. With this designation, which will initially remain in force until the 22nd<\/sup> of July 2027, the vessel is strictly subject to a number of prohibitions, including a ban on loading, transporting or unloading crude oil of Libyan origin; a total ban on access to EU ports; the denial of maritime services such as refuelling or provisioning; and an absolute restriction on carrying out financial transactions linked to its oil operations.<\/p>\n

Similarly, on the 7th August 2026, Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026\/1938 of the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026, implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015\/1333 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya,<\/a> was adopted.<\/p>\n

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026\/1938<\/strong>, adopted on the 7th<\/sup> of August 2026, amends the European legislation on restrictive measures in response to the situation in Libya<\/strong> (Decision (CFSP) 2015\/1333) to bring it into line with recent international mandates. Specifically, this legal update amends Annex V to include this new vessel<\/strong>, which was added on the 22nd<\/sup> of July 2026 by the United Nations Security Council Committee to its own list of sanctioned vessels.<\/p>\n

Proliferation and use of chemical weapons <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 11th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019\/84 of the 21st<\/sup> of January 2019 was adopted, implementing Regulation (EU) 2018\/1542 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (OJ L 18 I, 21.1.2019).<\/a><\/p>\n

The corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019\/84 corrects an inaccuracy in the annex to the regulation concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Specifically, the official document corrects the grounds for inclusion on the sanctions list to clarify the identity of the head of Institute 2000 \u2014 the division of the Centre for Scientific Studies and Research responsible for the mechanical development of Syria\u2019s chemical weapons programme \u2014 by replacing the name \u2018Khaled Nasri\u2019 with the correct name, \u2018Walid Zughaib\u2019, in order to ensure the legal accuracy of the sanction.<\/p>\n

On the 3rd<\/sup> of September 2026, the European Union adopted the Corrigendum to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019\/86 of the 21st<\/sup> of January 2019, amending Decision (CFSP) 2018\/1544 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (OJ L 18 I, 21.1.2019)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This publication in the Official Journal of the EU corrects an error in Decision (CFSP) 2019\/86 on restrictive measures against chemical weapons. The corrigendum amends the identity of a sanctioned individual in the annex, specifying that it is Walid Zughaib<\/strong> (and not Khaled Nasri) who heads the Institute 2000, a key entity in Syria\u2019s chemical weapons programme.<\/p>\n

ISIL (Daesh) and al-Qaeda <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 18th September 2026, the European Union adopted Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2143 of the 18th<\/sup> of September 2026, amending, for the 361st time, amendments to Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida<\/a><\/p>\n

Regulation (EU) 2026\/2143 updates the EU sanctions list targeting persons linked to ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida, amending the identifying details of two individuals included on the list. The changes follow a decision by the UN Sanctions Committee and do not add or remove any persons from the list, but rather update their personal and documentary information.<\/p>\n

On the 21st<\/sup> of September 2026, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2143 of the 18th<\/sup> of \u00a0September 2026, amending for the 361st amendments to Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the organisations ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida<\/a><\/p>\n

Regulation (EU) 2026\/2143 updates the EU sanctions list targeting persons linked to ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida, amending the identifying details of two individuals included on the list.<\/p>\n

The changes, adopted following a decision by the UN Sanctions Committee, consist solely of updating personal and documentary information; no individuals have been added to or removed from the sanctions list.<\/p>\n

Democratic Republic of the Congo<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/2191 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, implementing Regulation (EC) No 1183\/2005 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo<\/a> and Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2172 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, implementing Decision 2010\/788\/CFSP on the adoption of restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo<\/a>, pursuant to which it amends Annex I to Decision 2010\/788\/CFSP by adding four natural persons and one entity to the list of sanctioned persons. Consequently, it removes those natural and legal persons from Annex II to the same Decision.<\/p>\n

Burundi <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September 2026, the EU adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2026\/2197 of the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, amending Decision (CFSP) 2015\/1763 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi,<\/a> whereby the restrictive measures laid down in Decision (CFSP) 2015\/1763 are extended until the 31st<\/sup> of October 2027, and amending that Decision accordingly<\/p>\n

Terrorism<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 21st<\/sup> of August 2026, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1960 of the 20th<\/sup> of August 2026, amending for the 359th amendment to Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida.<\/a><\/p>\n

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1960 of the 20th<\/sup> of August 2026 amends Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 for the 359th time. Its aim is to update the restrictive measures (such as the freezing of funds) applied to persons and entities associated with the terrorist organisations ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida. This amendment is adopted to bring European legislation into line with recent decisions of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. Specifically, the document comprehensively updates Annex I, specifying the identification details, passports, addresses and aliases of five specific individuals. It also updates and expands the registration details of two specific organisations: the Ummah Tameer E-Nau (UTN) group and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant \u2013 Khorasan (ISIL-K).<\/p>\n

On the 26th<\/sup> of August 2026, in the same vein, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1965 of the 26th<\/sup> of August 2026 was published in the OJEU, amending, for the 360th amendment to Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida.<\/a><\/p>\n

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026\/1965, adopted on the 26th<\/sup> of August 2026, amends Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 881\/2002 for the 360th time. This update follows the decision taken on the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026 by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (established pursuant to Resolutions 1267, 1989 and 2253), which provides for the review and update of the identifying details of 21 entries relating to persons and entities linked to the terrorist organisations ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida.<\/p>\n

Among the individuals whose details have been amended are high-ranking members such as Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin<\/strong> (alias \u2018Hambali\u2019), the bomb-maker Ibrahim Hassan Tali Al-Asiri<\/strong> and the leader of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu Ubaydah Yusuf Al-Anabi<\/strong>. The details of members such as Peter Cherif<\/strong> have also been updated, specifying his life sentence in France. Furthermore, the regulation updates the information on linked terrorist entities and organisations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)<\/strong>, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi<\/strong> and the Wafa Humanitarian Organisation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

United States<\/h2>\n

On the 3rd<\/sup> of August 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury published the announcement<\/a> confirming the approval of the issuance of the Amended General Licence Relating to Venezuela<\/strong> 5Y<\/a> and the amendment to Frequently Asked Question 595 (FAQ 595)<\/a>. This General Licence No. 5Y authorises, with effect from the 17th<\/sup> of September 2026, transactions and financing relating to the 8.5 per cent PDVSA 2020 bond, which were previously prohibited by sanctions against Venezuela. It comes into force on the 3rd<\/sup> of August 2026, replacing General Licence 5X in its entirety, whilst not permitting transactions blocked by other regulations currently in force.<\/p>\n

FAQ 595<\/a> states that General Licence 5Y postpones until the 17th<\/sup> of September 2026 the authorisation for holders of the 8.5 per cent PDVSA 2020 bond to access its collateral. Consequently, the sale or transfer of CITGO shares linked to that bond remains prohibited until that date, unless expressly authorised. OFAC urges applicants to seek a specific licence if an agreement is reached to restructure or refinance payments owed to bondholders.<\/p>\n

On the 5th<\/sup> of August, designations, removals and updates were made in relation to counter-terrorism<\/a>. On the 5th<\/sup> of August 2026, OFAC updated its list of counter-terrorism sanctions<\/strong>. The Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad and its aliases were removed from this list. Two aircraft belonging to this company were also removed from the sanctions list. Meanwhile, the sanction against the Iraqi national Basheer Al-Shabbani remained in place. However, his file was updated to link him directly to Iran\u2019s Quds Force.<\/p>\n

On the 6th<\/sup> of August, designations relating to Cuba were made and a frequently asked question (FAQ) on Cuba<\/strong> was published<\/a>. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury has published a new guideline (FAQ 1264<\/a>) on Cuba and has updated its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) to incorporate new sanctions. Specifically, the document formalises the blacklisting of six Cuban citizens and five entities linked to the state and the island\u2019s military sector, notably the Military Industry Union, TECNOTEX, TECHNOIMPORT and the Yuri Gagarin Military Industrial Enterprise. Furthermore, the update amends and expands the identifying details of two senior officers of the Cuban Armed Forces who were already on the sanctions list: Roberto Legr\u00e1 Sotolongo and \u00c1lvaro L\u00f3pez Miera.<\/p>\n

OFAC\u2019s FAQ 1264<\/a> clarifies that the sanctions imposed by Executive Order 14404 are not intended to penalise non-US persons who provide humanitarian assistance \u2014 such as food, agricultural products, medicines and medical devices \u2014 to Cuba<\/strong>, permitting such transactions even if they involve previously sanctioned entities. The document sets out the legal definitions of these essential goods and stipulates that any US individual or entity participating in such transactions must strictly comply with the requirements of General Licence 1. Furthermore, the text highlights that the US government is channelling US$100 million in direct aid to the Cuban people through independent organisations, and states that any humanitarian activity exceeding this general framework will be assessed by OFAC on a case-by-case basis, with priority given to requests of a humanitarian nature.<\/p>\n

On the 7th<\/sup> of August, OFAC approved designations relating to counter-terrorism and Iran; removed designations relating to counter-narcotics; and published an amended frequently asked question relating to Iran<\/a><\/p>\n

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury has issued an amendment to Frequently Asked Question 1257 (FAQ 1257<\/a>) on Iran and has made multiple updates to its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). Specifically, the agency has sanctioned five individuals and thirteen entities linked to Iran and to terrorist financing<\/strong> networks, including cryptocurrency exchange platforms and commercial firms based in the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Singapore, Poland and Georgia (such as Aban Tether, Shelbit and Titan Exchange). At the same time, OFAC has removed several individuals and companies based in Colombia and Mexico (such as Heriberto Zazueta Godoy and Producci\u00f3n Pesquera Do\u00f1a Mariela) from its blacklist; these had previously been designated under the regulatory framework for sanctions against drug trafficking<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

OFAC\u2019s FAQ 1257<\/a> warns that non-US persons and foreign financial institutions face severe secondary sanctions if they conduct transactions with Iranian digital asset<\/strong> exchange platforms designated under Executive Order 13902 (such as Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, Ramzinex and Aban Tether). Consequently, OFAC has the authority to sanction those who provide material, technological or financial support to these platforms, as well as to prohibit or impose strict conditions on the correspondent accounts of foreign banks that facilitate significant transactions on behalf of such entities.<\/p>\n

On the 12th<\/sup> of August 2026, a settlement agreement was reached between the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury and Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc.<\/a><\/p>\n

OFAC imposed a fine of $60,764 on the US company Rice Lake for violating the sanctions imposed on Iran<\/strong>. Its Italian subsidiary exported weighing equipment to Iran via a distributor in the United Arab Emirates between 2019 and 2021. The case was resolved through this settlement as the company self-reported the violations, which were deemed non-serious.<\/p>\n

For further information, please refer to the following enforcement release<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026, the company Bluwaves Properties Limited was added to the sanctions regime against Venezuela<\/strong>.<\/a> In addition, General Licence 12 was issued to authorise the phased winding down of transactions with those affected.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, on the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026, OFAC updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, adding two individuals and one entity<\/a>. Tomoko Akane and Abdoulaye Seye were sanctioned under measures relating to the International Criminal Court<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

On the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026, OFAC also issued General Licence 12 relating to the International Criminal Court<\/a>, \u201cAuthorising the settlement of transactions involving certain persons blocked on the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026\u201d.<\/p>\n

On the 20th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury announced multiple sanctions and regulatory updates<\/a>, beginning with the issuance of General Licence 131I<\/a> relating to Russia<\/strong> to authorise certain transactions linked to Lukoil. In the field of drug trafficking and terrorism<\/strong>, OFAC designated an extensive Ecuadorian network involved in maritime cocaine trafficking linked to violent gangs and cartels, sanctioning numerous individuals, fishing companies and their vessels. At the same time, sanctions were imposed on a Turkey-based network responsible for smuggling millions of dollars in cash for Hezbollah, including facilitators linked to the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the package of measures included tough sanctions targeting actors within the Cuban regime involved in Marxist subversive networks and economic corruption. This resulted in the inclusion on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list of several Cuban officials and numerous state-controlled companies in key sectors such as construction, mining and foreign trade. Finally, OFAC updated the entries for previously sanctioned entities, expanding the information on the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP) and detailing Hezbollah\u2019s transnational operational links.<\/p>\n

In addition, OFAC is amending two associated frequently asked questions relating to Russia<\/strong> (FAQs 1224 and 1225) and one frequently asked question relating to Cuba<\/strong> (FAQ 1265).<\/p>\n

FAQ 1224<\/a> explains that OFAC General Licence 131I permits the negotiation of conditional contracts for the sale of the subsidiary Lukoil International GmbH (LIG). This licence expires in September 2026 and does not authorise the actual sale, which requires an additional permit from OFAC. In order for such a final sale to be approved, a complete and irrevocable severance of ties between LIG and its sanctioned Russian parent company, Lukoil, will be required. The proceeds must be deposited into a blocked account under US jurisdiction to prevent Russia from deriving any benefit. OFAC warns that it will revoke this licence at any time if it determines that negotiations are not being conducted in good faith.<\/p>\n

FAQ 1225<\/a> states that OFAC has issued General Licences (GL) 128C and 131I to authorise certain transactions with Lukoil International GmbH (LIG) and its subsidiaries, with the dual aim of mitigating the impact on retail consumers and facilitating the divestment of assets outside Russia<\/strong>. GL 128C (valid until the 29th<\/sup> of October 2026) permits the maintenance and closure of LIG\u2019s overseas petrol stations, whilst GL 131I (valid until the 19th<\/sup> of September 2026) authorises maintenance and closure activities for all LIG entities. Both licences permit the carrying out of routine commercial transactions (such as the payment of wages, rent, utilities and taxes) and ensure that financial institutions (including foreign ones) can process these payments without risk of sanctions, provided that they do not involve other blocked persons and the strict condition that no funds are transferred to Russia is met.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, FAQ 1265<\/a> explains that following the designation of Cuba<\/strong>\u2019s Ministry of Construction (MICONS), the US government has clarified that it will not sanction foreign individuals or financial institutions that carry out transactions strictly necessary to wind up and close their operations with that entity in an orderly manner until the 19th<\/sup> of September 2026. However, OFAC warns that attempting to return or transfer assets to MICONS carries a high risk of sanctions, and advises those unable to meet the deadline to contact the agency directly. Finally, the document emphasises that this temporary flexibility does not apply to individuals or companies under US jurisdiction, who remain strictly prohibited from any interaction with MICONS under previous regulations, unless they hold specific licences, such as those relating to humanitarian purposes.<\/p>\n

On the 21st<\/sup> of August, OFAC published a news item regarding the issuance of General Licences relating to Venezuela<\/strong> and an associated Frequently Asked Question<\/a><\/p>\n

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury has today issued General Licence 61 concerning Venezuela<\/strong><\/a> (Authorisation for the supply of certain telecommunications-related goods and services to Venezuela<\/em>) and General Licence 62 concerning Venezuela<\/strong><\/a> (Authorisation for the negotiation and signing of contingent contracts for investment in Venezuela\u2019s telecommunications sector<\/em>). In addition, OFAC is issuing a new Frequently Asked Question relating to Venezuela (FAQ 1266<\/a>).<\/p>\n

OFAC General Licence No. 61<\/strong> authorises US persons to provide goods, technology, software and services for the installation, maintenance, repair, operation and support of the telecommunications sector in Venezuela (including government entities such as CONATEL and CANTV), provided that the contracts are governed by US law and disputes are resolved in the US, the United Kingdom, France or Singapore. This measure covers data, internet, telephony, radio, TV and submarine cable services, but strictly excludes transactions in petros or cryptocurrencies, the unblocking of assets, the formation of joint ventures<\/em>, and any operation involving persons or entities from Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba or China. Furthermore, persons using this licence must comply with a detailed reporting scheme to the State Department within 10 days of the first transaction and, subsequently, every 90 days whilst the transactions remain in progress.<\/p>\n

OFAC General Licence No. 62<\/strong> authorises the negotiation and signing of contingent contracts \u2014 including binding offers, memoranda of understanding, tenders and preliminary due diligence assessments \u2014 for new investments, the expansion of operations or the creation of joint ventures<\/em> in the telecommunications sector in Venezuela (including entities such as CONATEL and CANTV), subject to the strict condition that the actual execution of such agreements is contingent upon prior and separate authorisation from OFAC. This measure expressly excludes any transaction or partnership involving persons or entities from Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba or China, nor does it authorise the unblocking of property or assets previously sanctioned under the VSR regulations.<\/p>\n

Frequently Asked Question 1266<\/strong> clarifies that General Licence 61 authorises the transactions necessary for US persons to supply goods, technology, software and services intended for telecommunications operations and infrastructure in Venezuela \u2014 including state-owned entities such as CONATEL, CANTV and Movilnet\u2014covering data, the internet, telephony, radio, television, international connectivity and submarine cables, as well as logistics, roaming<\/em> agreements, cloud storage and ancillary financial services. However, it specifies that the licence explicitly prohibits disproportionate payments, payments in gold, debt swaps or state-backed cryptocurrencies (such as the petro), the creation of joint ventures<\/em>, the release of sanctioned property or vessels, and any interaction with individuals or entities linked to Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba or China.<\/p>\n

On the 24th<\/sup> of August 2026, OFAC removed Syria from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and carried out associated updates to the sanctions lists; designations relating to Iran; and updates to the General Licences relating to Iran.<\/a><\/p>\n

In accordance with the commitment to lift sanctions on Syria, the US Department of State removed Syria from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, thereby lifting the associated prohibitions. Similarly, the designation of the al-Nusrah Front (also known as HTS) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation was revoked; consequently, OFAC removed it from the SDN list and cancelled General Licence 25, deeming it unnecessary. Furthermore, several government agencies issued an updated joint notice on the easing of export controls and sanctions for the country.<\/p>\n

At the same time, OFAC implemented stringent measures regarding its Iran-related sanctions programmes. This includes the publication of a new determination under Executive Order 13902<\/a> targeting key sectors such as aviation, digital assets, gold, maritime transport and technology, as well as the suspension of general licences relating to academic and sporting exchanges. Conversely, new specific licences were issued authorising the phased closure of certain pre-existing transactions and particular operations involving specific entities, whilst an updated alert was also issued regarding the risks arising from Iranian demands in the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n

Finally, OFAC comprehensively updated its SDN list, adding dozens of individuals, companies and vessels linked to illicit activities. Notable among the additions are citizens of Iran, China, Turkey and India accused of cyber-attacks, weapons proliferation and links to oil transport or the Quds Force. Furthermore, sanctions were imposed on numerous shipping companies, logistics firms and international technology firms based in Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, alongside the inclusion of oil tankers and tankers engaged in unauthorised trade.<\/p>\n

On the 26th<\/sup> of August, OFAC made designations relating to counter-terrorism; issued a general licence against terrorism; and issued an amended general licence relating to Russia<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The US Department of the Treasury, through OFAC, announced on the 26th<\/sup> of August 2026 a series of regulatory measures, including the issuance of two key licences. Firstly, General Licence 36<\/a> against terrorism was issued, authorising the orderly winding down of transactions related to the entity Autistici Inventati<\/em>. Furthermore, the amended General Licence 104B<\/a> relating to Russia was issued, authorising certain transactions linked to the import of specific diamonds that were previously prohibited.<\/p>\n

In addition to these licences, OFAC updated its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) as part of its actions against violent far-left terrorist networks. In this update, Autistici Inventati<\/em> (Italy), Masar Badil<\/em> (operating in several countries) and Palestine Action<\/em> (United Kingdom) were designated as sanctioned entities. Furthermore, two individuals, Zaid Abdulnasser and Rawa Alsagheer, were added to the list due to their links with the organisation Masar Badil<\/em>.<\/p>\n

On the 27th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury issued amended general licences relating to Venezuela and associated frequently asked questions<\/a>. These authorisations cover a wide range of strategic sectors, permitting certain activities and transactions relating to Venezuelan-sourced oil, petrochemicals, gas and the operations of Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), as well as the sale of US-sourced diluents, the trading of minerals (including gold) and the supply of telecommunications equipment and services.<\/p>\n

In addition to issuing these eight licences, OFAC has updated its guidance documentation for the public by revising its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) relating to Venezuela. As part of this measure, the agency published two new questions (1267 and 1268), amended two existing ones (1233 and 1244) and archived question number 1260, in order to provide greater clarity on the application of the recent authorisations.<\/p>\n

The new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1267 and 1268<\/a>) published by OFAC clarify certain conditions regarding contracts authorised under the recent general licences for Venezuela. Specifically, FAQ 1267 explains that, with effect from the 27th<\/sup> of August 2026, contracts entered into with the Government of Venezuela or blocked entities (such as PDVSA) are no longer required to be interpreted and governed by the laws of a US state or jurisdiction. OFAC removed this requirement in response to the investment reforms implemented by the Venezuelan government since January 2026, with a view to supporting the reinvestment of US companies in the country.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, FAQ 1268 complements this measure by clarifying that, despite the relaxation regarding the applicable law, contracts must still include a specific dispute resolution clause. This provision stipulates that any proceedings to resolve legal disputes arising from such agreements must be conducted exclusively in certain permitted jurisdictions, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Singapore. In this way, the Treasury Department draws a clear distinction between the law governing the commercial agreement and the international courts or forums where any disputes must be settled.<\/p>\n

The Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1233 and 1244)<\/a> provide key details on the contractual requirements under OFAC\u2019s general licences for Venezuela. As amended, FAQ 1233 clarifies that the dispute resolution requirement applies exclusively to contracts entered into directly between a US-based entity and the Government of Venezuela, PDVSA, or any entity in which PDVSA holds a 50 per cent or greater stake. This modifies the general interpretation by exempting indirect parties involved in downstream transactions\u2014such as companies providing shipping services or insurance cover\u2014from this requirement [cite: 1.1.6].<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the update to FAQ 1244 establishes and confirms that applications for specific licences to carry out contingent contracts will be assessed on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis, ensuring that such transactions are consistent with US foreign policy and national security [cite: 1.2.1].<\/p>\n

On the 2nd<\/sup> of September, OFAC published an update on Blocked Assets and General Licences for Venezuela<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the 1st<\/sup> of July 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a statement reminding US persons and entities with blocked property that they must submit their Annual Report on Blocked Property (ARBP) by the 30th<\/sup> of September 2026 to avoid potential sanctions, and recommending that they consult the 2026 ARBP Filing Guide<\/a> for further information. Furthermore, the notice announces the issuance of three new General Licences relating to Venezuela (51D<\/a>, 54C<\/a> and 55A<\/a>), which authorise various activities, supplies and investments linked to the coal and minerals sectors in that country, alongside an update to Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) number 1247<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the 3rd<\/sup> of September, OFAC published updates on sanctions against Cuba and the removal of Russian entities from the sanctions list<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the 3rd<\/sup> of September 2026, the Treasury Department\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the issuance of General Licence 4A<\/a> for Cuba, which authorises transactions for diplomatic and consular missions of third countries on the island. At the same time, the agency updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, adding one individual, Fidel Ernesto Castro Calis, and five Cuban financial and commercial entities linked to the exploitation of oil and mineral resources, including the Banco Exterior de Cuba. Furthermore, OFAC removed the company Dulac Capital Ltd from its list of Russia-related sanctions, along with all its aliases and commercial representations.<\/p>\n

On the 4th<\/sup> of September 2026, OFAC published new sanctions against Iranian financial networks in Turkey and General Licence CC.<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 4th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Treasury Department\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the issuance of the General Licence CC<\/a>, intended to authorise the orderly wind-down<\/em> of transactions involving the individuals and entities subject to sanctions as of that date. As part of a strategy to cut off the Iranian regime\u2019s sources of funding in Turkey, OFAC updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List to include three entities from the Turkish financial and stock market sector: Golden Global Yat\u0131r\u0131m Bankas\u0131 (Golden Global Investment Bank) along with its affiliated firms, Golden Global Portf\u00f6y Y\u00f6netimi and Golden Global Varl\u0131k Kiralama.<\/p>\n

On the 8th<\/sup> of September 2026, new US Treasury sanctions targeting Iran\u2019s civil aviation sector were published on the official OFAC website.<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 8th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury implemented a series of far-reaching sanctions aimed at crippling Iran\u2019s civil aviation sector. As part of these measures, OFAC suspended existing licences that permitted certain transactions and the temporary re-export of civil aircraft to Iran (such as General Licence J-1 for Iran). At the same time, it issued new regulations, including Counter-Terrorism General Licence 37 and General Licence DD, in order to authorise a period of winding down and orderly closure of the civil aviation operations that were previously permitted.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, OFAC updated its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), blacklisting more than twenty commercial airlines based in Iran, such as ATA Airlines, Qeshm Air, Iran Air Tour and Zagros Airlines. The measure also sanctions one individual and various international aviation logistics and support companies based in the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Turkey and Kazakhstan, due to their supportive links with the sanctioned airline Mahan Air and for posing risks of secondary sanctions under counter-terrorism programmes.<\/p>\n

On the 9th<\/sup> of September, the US imposed sanctions on a transnational cybercrime group known as \u201cLos Tiguerones\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n

The US Department of the Treasury, through OFAC, has sanctioned a transnational criminal network responsible for cyber-fraud operations targeting US citizens. As part of this action, \u201cXinbi Guarantee\u201d \u2013 an organisation operating in South-East Asia that makes extensive use of cryptocurrencies \u2013 was added to the list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), along with associated technology firms in Cambodia and Singapore. In addition, OFAC designated the criminal group \u201cLos Tiguerones\u201d, which operates in Ecuador and Peru, as a Transnational Terrorist Organisation.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, as part of its ongoing efforts to keep its regulations up to date, OFAC amended a dozen existing Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and published two new ones relating to guidelines on licensing and name assessment. The agency also made various administrative corrections to dozens of existing entries on the SDN list (including organisations such as ISIL Khorasan and several individuals), clarifying that these changes are purely technical adjustments to the information and do not constitute new sanctions.<\/p>\n

On the 10th<\/sup> of September, the US Treasury issued an update on licensing policy and regulatory designations relating to Iran<\/a><\/p>\n

The US Department of the Treasury, through OFAC, has stepped up its measures against the global network of terrorist intermediaries linked to Iran through \u2018Operation Economic Outcast\u2019. As part of this crackdown, the policy on licences relating to Iran has been amended, establishing a presumption of denial for new applications, with very limited exceptions linked to the protection of life and the environment. Furthermore, the agency announced a settlement agreement under which an individual will pay over 1.4 million dollars for serious sanctions violations; the individual was penalised for providing consultancy services to an Iranian software company, receiving dividends and acquiring property in that country without having voluntarily disclosed this.<\/p>\n

At the same time, OFAC has updated its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), blacklisting numerous individuals and entities that facilitate operations for this network, which the US designates as terrorist. The new designations target individuals and companies based in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Emirates that maintain links with sanctioned groups such as Hezbollah and Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah. Among the sanctioned entities are technology and security firms, general contracting companies, commercial enterprises and financial services firms, with the aim of dismantling the economic and logistical infrastructure that underpins Iran\u2019s destabilising activities in the region.<\/p>\n

On the 14th<\/sup> of September, the US Treasury issued a new licence for PdVSA and extended sanctions against the Russian bank VTB due to links with Iran<\/a><\/p>\n

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury issued General Licence 52C relating to Venezuela, which authorises certain specific transactions involving Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). Alongside this authorisation, the agency published an update to its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 1245) to provide further regulatory guidance on its sanctions programme regarding Venezuela.<\/p>\n

As part of \u2018Operation Economic Outcast\u2019, OFAC also updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List and Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List to sanction a major financial institution that supposedly assists Iran in evading sanctions. The profile of the Russian state-owned bank VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company was amended to include a new operational headquarters in Tehran, Iran, thereby subjecting the entity to secondary sanctions under the Iran sanctions programme, in addition to the restrictions it already faced under the sanctions programmes relating to Russia and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

On the 16th<\/sup> of September, the US issued General Licence 5Z for Venezuela and updated the OFAC sanctions list<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 16th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury issued General Licence 5Z for Venezuela<\/a>, which authorises certain transactions relating to the Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) 2020 at 8.5 per cent with effect from the 5th<\/sup> of November 2026, and amended Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 595<\/a> relating to the sanctions regime against Venezuela. Furthermore, OFAC updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), removing from it Jose Raul Vega Sanchez (Mexico), Hans Peter Bomatter (Switzerland) and the Turkish company Modulsan Makina Kesici Takim ve Disli Sanayi Ticaret Limited Sirketi. Consequently, these individuals and the entity are no longer subject to the relevant sanctions imposed by OFAC.<\/p>\n

FAQ 595<\/a> clarifies that General Licence 5Z extends until the 5th<\/sup> of November 2026 the authorisation for transactions relating to CITGO shares that secure the 8.5 per cent PDVSA 2020 bond. Until that date, such transactions remain prohibited unless specifically authorised by OFAC.<\/p>\n

On the 17th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List<\/a>),<\/u> adding new individuals and entities linked to Iran and Cuba, including organisations in the financial, technology, defence and mining sectors.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, OFAC removed several Belarusian entities from the list, including Lakokraska OAO and Bellesbumprom (and their associated names), which are no longer subject to the relevant US sanctions.<\/p>\n

On the 18th<\/sup> of September 2026, OFAC lifted sanctions on Ethiopia and issued a new licence relating to Russia for Lukoil<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 18th<\/sup> of September 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the expiry of the national emergency declared by Executive Order 14046,<\/a> relating to the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Ethiopia, which led to the removal of several individuals and entities from the SDN list. It also issued General Licence 131J<\/a> relating to Russia, which authorises certain transactions connected with the negotiation and conclusion of contingent contracts for the sale of Lukoil International GmbH, and updated FAQs 1224 and 1225.<\/p>\n

FAQs 1224 and 1225,<\/a> updated by OFAC, clarify the scope of General Licence 131J<\/a>, specifying that certain activities relating to the negotiation and conclusion of contingent contracts, as well as maintenance operations linked to the sale of Lukoil International GmbH, remain authorised under the conditions set out in that licence.<\/p>\n

On the 23rd<\/sup> of September, OFAC removed Congolese General Fran\u00e7ois Olenga and his \u2018Safari Club\u2019 complex from its sanctions list.<\/a><\/p>\n

The US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) updated its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) on the 23rd<\/sup> of September 2026 to remove sanctions relating to the Democratic Republic of the Congo that affected General Fran\u00e7ois Olenga \u2014 including his various aliases and name variants \u2014 as well as the associated entity \u2018Safari Club\u2019 (or \u2018Safari Beach\u2019).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the statement includes a minor and separate administrative amendment concerning a Cuban entity (CIDAI), in which only a typographical error in its address was corrected (\u2018\u00bd\u2019 to \u20181\/2\u2019), without this implying any new sanctions, additions or substantial changes to its status.<\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September, OFAC published the new regulations on sanctions against Cuba and amended the CACR.<\/a>
\nOn the 29th<\/sup> of September 2026, the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) published the implementing regulations for Executive Order 14404, dated the 1st<\/sup> of May 2026, which imposes sanctions on those responsible for repression in Cuba and for threats to US national security and foreign policy. It also amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR, 31 C.F.R. Part 515) to implement part of the President\u2019s foreign policy towards Cuba. Both regulations will come into force upon their publication in the Federal Register on the 30th of September 2026.<\/p>\n

In addition, OFAC issued five new FAQs on Cuba (1271 to 1275), amended a further 29, and published the alert \u2018Expanded Sanctions Against Cuba\u2019, which warns of increased sanctions risks in transactions involving Cuba.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the communiqu\u00e9 includes the incorporation of Executive Order 13902 (additional sectors of the Iranian economy) into the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), as well as a purely formal reorganisation of the CFR, with no substantive impact.<\/p>\n

On the 30th<\/sup> of September 2026, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the Tren de Aragua financial network and updated its SDN list<\/a><\/p>\n

The US Treasury Department sanctioned the financial network of the transnational criminal organisation Tren de Aragua \u2014 including nine individuals and two linked entities in Venezuela and Mexico \u2014 following the theft of millions of dollars from US banks, whilst announcing the removal of various previous designations relating to Belarus, narcotics and Libya from its list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs).<\/p>\n

United Kingdom<\/h2>\n

Russia <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 6th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List on GOV.UK with 19 new entries.<\/a> These include companies in strategic sectors (energy and chemicals), various financial institutions (such as Ozon Bank, Exim Bank and Center-Invest), the Russian national Aleksander Zhdanov, and numerous vessels allegedly involved in the international transport of oil and liquefied natural gas of Russian origin. The sanctions imposed are severe and include the freezing of assets, travel bans, the disqualification of directors, a ban on correspondent banking relationships, and strict maritime restrictions prohibiting designated vessels from entering British ports, operating, receiving technical assistance or registering in the United Kingdom, with a warning of criminal liability in the event of non-compliance.<\/p>\n

On the 2nd<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated its Sanctions List under the Russia regime<\/a> to implement four administrative corrections affecting the individual Stanislav Bronislavovich Klevitskiy and the entities Glenbrook Corporation Limited, Joint Stock Company Teleport Bank and JSC Altay Instrument-Making Plant Rotor. Despite these amendments to their registration details, the four entities remain subject to strict sanctions, including the freezing of assets, the disqualification of directors and restrictions on fiduciary and transport services, due to their supposed involvement in strategic sectors (technology, energy, finance and defence) deemed to benefit or support the Russian government; Consequently, all individuals and institutions are reminded of their legal obligation to freeze these assets and to refrain from conducting transactions with them.<\/p>\n

On the 3rd<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated its sanctions list under the Russia regime<\/a> to apply an administrative correction to the entry for the entity \u2018LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY \u201cOZON BANK\u201d\u2019 (also known as EKOM Bank or Oney Bank). Despite this technical amendment to its details, the Russian financial institution remains subject to severe punitive measures, including the freezing of assets, the disqualification of its directors, restrictions on trust services and a strict prohibition on UK entities maintaining correspondent banking relationships with it or processing payments on its behalf, due to its alleged strategic role in supporting the Russian government. The notice reiterates to all parties involved their legal obligation to freeze this institution\u2019s funds and warns that any attempt to circumvent these restrictions constitutes a criminal offence in the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n

On the 10th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK\u2019s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated its sanctions list under the Russia regime<\/a> to apply an official amendment to the registration of the financial institution \u2018JSC SOLID BANK\u2019. Despite this change to its details, the Russian bank remains subject to strict punitive measures, including the freezing of assets, the disqualification of directors, and a ban on both trust services and correspondent banking and clearing operations in sterling. These sanctions remain in force due to the bank\u2019s presumed role in Russia\u2019s financial sector, in the opinion of the UK. It is considered to be of strategic importance to the Russian government; companies and individuals are warned that failure to comply with these restrictions constitutes a criminal offence in the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n

On the 11th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK updated its sanctions list under the Russia regime<\/a> to amend the entry for the Turkish company S-MIKRON ELEKTRONIK<\/strong>, which has been sanctioned for supplying goods or technology that contribute to the destabilisation of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Despite this administrative update, all restrictions on the company remain in place (such as the asset freeze and the disqualification of directors). The British government requires that any funds linked to this entity be frozen and reiterates that evading these measures constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 21st<\/sup> of September, the UK lifted maritime sanctions against the oil tanker ASTRA under the sanctions regime against Russia<\/a><\/p>\n

The UK\u2019s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) updated the UK Sanctions List following the revocation of the restrictive measures imposed on the oil tanker ASTRA \u2014 flying the Vietnamese flag and operated by Stravax Shipping Co Ltd \u2014 which had previously been sanctioned in September 2025 with port access and registration bans due to its alleged involvement in the transport of Russian oil and activities related to the destabilisation of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 7th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK updated its sanctions list under the regime against ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda<\/a> to record official changes to the details of Abubakar Swalleh, a Ugandan national sanctioned for recruiting, providing logistical support and financing ISIL in eastern and southern Africa since 2018. Despite these changes to his identifying details \u2014 which include an update to the accuracy of his aliases and the recording of his use of a fraudulent Zambian passport \u2014 Swalleh remains subject to the severe restrictions imposed by the UN and the United Kingdom, which include an asset freeze, an arms embargo and a travel ban, with the British government reiterating that breaching these measures constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 10th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office<\/a> updated its sanctions list under the regime against ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda to apply an administrative correction to the profile of Ugandan national Abubakar Swalleh, who is subject to sanctions for providing financial, logistical and recruitment support to ISIL in Eastern and Southern Africa. This technical amendment reorganises the details regarding his identity documents, specifically relocating the information concerning a fraudulent passport issued by Zambia. Despite these formatting adjustments, Swalleh remains strictly subject to all existing punitive measures \u2014 which include an asset freeze, an arms embargo and a travel ban \u2014 and the British government reiterates that failure to comply with these restrictions constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 29th<\/sup> of September 2026, the United Kingdom updated the details of the terrorist group Khatiba Jama\u2019at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad under the sanctions regime against ISIS and Al-Qaeda<\/a><\/p>\n

The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) updated the technical information on the terrorist group Khatiba Jama\u2019 at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) on the UK Sanctions List, keeping its restrictive measures\u2014which include an asset freeze and an arms embargo\u2014fully in force against this organisation linked to the Al-Nusrah Front, which operates mainly in Syria and other countries in the region.<\/p>\n

Afghanistan <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 27th<\/sup> of August 2026, the UK\u2019s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) updated the sanctions list concerning Afghanistan to correct the identifying details of two individuals subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban<\/a>: Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani<\/strong> and Jalaluddin Haqqani<\/strong>. The administrative amendments include the clarification of aliases (such as the name in the Latin alphabet \u2018Abdul Satar Abdullah\u2019), the updating of Afghan passport numbers along with their dates of issue and expiry, and the correction of places of birth and biographical information. The notice also reiterates the strict legal obligation on businesses and individuals to immediately freeze the funds or economic resources of these individuals, to refrain from making assets available to them without a licence from OFSI, and to report any findings to the relevant authorities to avoid committing criminal offences.<\/p>\n

On the 28th<\/sup> of August 2026, the UK\u2019s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) updated its sanctions list under the Afghanistan regime to reflect changes to the profile of Abdul Salam Hanafi Ali Mardan Qul, a member of the Taliban subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban.<\/a> The document details updates to his identification details, such as diplomatic passports and places of birth, and reiterates the strict legal obligation to freeze the individual\u2019s funds, prohibit the transfer of financial resources to him, and report any findings to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), warning that failure to comply with these regulations constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

Global Human Rights<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 8th<\/sup> of September 2026, the United Kingdom updated its sanctions list under the Global Human Rights regime<\/a> to include five individuals (Ben-Zion Gopstein, Meir Mordechai Ettinger, Eliav Libi, Baruch Marzel and Avichai Suissa), accused of facilitating, inciting, promoting and supporting acts of violence and serious human rights abuses against the Palestinian population in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As a result of this designation, the British government has imposed strict punitive measures on them, including an asset freeze, a travel ban and a disqualification from holding directorships, whilst reminding all persons and institutions under its jurisdiction that they have an inescapable legal obligation to block any funds linked to these individuals, as circumventing these restrictions constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 9th<\/sup> of September 2026, the United Kingdom updated its sanctions list under the Global Human Rights regime<\/a> to amend the entry for the entity XINBI COMPANY LIMITED<\/strong> (and its subsidiary Xinbi Guarantee). The company remains subject to an asset freeze and the disqualification of its directors because it provides financial services and derives financial benefit from the operation of scam centres in South-East Asia, where victims suffer serious human rights violations, including cruel treatment, slavery and forced labour. The update formally links the company to dozens of cryptocurrency addresses (on the Tron network) used in its operations, with the British government reiterating that any attempt to circumvent these financial restrictions constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 10th<\/sup> of September 2026, the United Kingdom updated its sanctions list under the Global Human Rights regime<\/a> to make an administrative correction to the profile of Israeli national Avichai Suissa. Despite this technical adjustment, Suissa remains strictly subject to severe punitive measures \u2014 including an asset freeze, a travel ban and disqualification from holding executive positions \u2014 for providing funds, resources and financial services whilst knowing that they contribute to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The British Government reiterates the legal obligation to freeze any assets linked to this individual, noting that attempting to evade or breach these restrictions constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

Counter Terrorism <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 14th<\/sup> of August 2026, the United Kingdom updated its sanctions list against the ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda regimes.<\/a> The official details of one entity (Ummah Tameer E-Nau) and three individuals linked to terrorism were amended. The individuals whose details have been updated are Adem Yilmaz, Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane and Shafi Sultan Mohammed Al-Ajmi. All of them remain subject to severe restrictions, including asset freezes, arms embargoes and travel bans.<\/p>\n

On the 17th<\/sup> of August 2026, the United Kingdom updated its sanctions list against the ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda regime<\/a>. The entries for three individuals linked to terrorism were amended: Amin Muhammad Ul Haq, Abubakar Swalleh and Hamidah Nabagala. Information relating to the entity Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant \u2013 Khorasan (ISIL-K) was also updated. All those mentioned remain subject to asset freezes, arms embargoes and travel bans.<\/p>\n

On the 20th<\/sup> of August 2026, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List against the ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda regimes<\/a>, making twenty-one amendments to the details of various individuals and entities. The designated entities continue to face strict measures, including an unconditional asset freeze, arms embargoes and travel bans. Citizens and businesses are legally required to withhold any funds linked to them and to deny them access to economic or financial resources. Furthermore, the document emphasises that failure to comply with or evasion of these provisions constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

On the 8th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UK\u2019s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office<\/a> updated its sanctions list under the International Counter-Terrorism regime to include the Lebanese entity AL-QARD AL-HASAN<\/strong> (AQAH). This organisation has been sanctioned with the freezing of its assets and the disqualification of its directors due to its close association with Hezbollah, a group to which it provides funds and financial services intended for terrorist purposes. The British Government emphasises that any individual or institution possessing or controlling financial resources linked to this organisation has a strict legal obligation to freeze them and report them immediately, warning that failure to comply with or any attempt to circumvent these measures constitutes a criminal offence.<\/p>\n

United Nations<\/h2>\n

ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 4th<\/sup> of September, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee amended two entries on its sanctions list targeting ISIS and Al-Qaeda<\/a><\/p>\n

The Security Council Sanctions Committee on ISIS (Da\u2019esh) and Al-Qaeda formally updated the files of two sanctioned individuals \u2014 Sanaullah Ghafari, leader of the Khorasan branch, and Abubakar Swalleh, a financial facilitator in eastern and southern Africa\u2014 whilst maintaining the mandatory restrictive measures against them under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which include an asset freeze, a travel ban and an arms embargo.<\/p>\n

On the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, the UN Security Council amended the entry for Khatiba Jama\u2019at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad on its sanctions list against ISIS and Al-Qaeda (28 September 2026)<\/a><\/p>\n

On the 28th<\/sup> of September 2026, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee concerning ISIS (Da\u2019esh) and Al-Qaeda approved amendments to the entry for the terrorist organisation Khatiba Jama\u2019at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) on its consolidated list, keeping fully in force the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo imposed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on this organisation linked to the Al-Nusrah Front, which operates in Syria and other countries.<\/p>\n

Afghanistan<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 27th<\/sup> of August 2026, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee, established pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011), amended its list of individuals subject to asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes to update the profile of the Taliban leader Abdul Salam Hanafi Ali Mardan Qul.<\/a> This technical amendment includes the addition and correction of key identifying details of the sanctioned individual \u2014 such as alternative dates and places of birth, precise aliases and new information regarding his passports \u2014 in order to maintain the accuracy of the UN\u2019s consolidated register and ensure the correct application of these international measures.<\/p>\n

Terrorism <\/strong><\/p>\n

On the 18th<\/sup> of August 2026, the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee on ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda amended 21 entries (relating to individuals and entities) on its official sanctions list.<\/a> These updates, which form part of international measures involving asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes, include corrections and new details regarding aliases, locations, identity documents and the vital status of those subject to sanctions, reflecting recent deaths, arrests and convictions. With these changes, based on information provided by Member States, the organisation keeps its consolidated list up to date to ensure strict compliance with international resolutions against terrorism.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

*******************************************<\/p>\n

In Madrid, 30 September 2026<\/p>\n

International Trade and Sanctions Department<\/p>\n

Lupicinio International Law Firm<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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